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Preface 
Thanks to my supervisor Asbjørn Rødseth for his time spent on remarks, suggestions and for 
correcting the mistakes I have done in the process of writing this thesis. 
When I started my studies in economics five years ago one of the things that motivated me 
was the desire to understand macroeconomic issues that are discussed in news, social 
gatherings and general policy debate. 
Through these five years as a student in economics, monetary policy and international macro 
are the areas that have interested me the most. My years of schooling in economy have 
presented me for academic tools, models and concepts to discuss and understand economic 
issues. In this thesis I will use these tools to shed some light on the functioning of the 
European Monetary Union. 
This paper makes use of simple statistical procedures. It consists of mostly hypothesis and 
less proofs and is best understood as general contribution to the discussion of the big puzzle 
about the functioning of the EMU. 
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Abstract 
This thesis attempts to shed some light upon the functioning of the EMU. The discussion is 
presented in the light of established monetary policy and optimal currency area-theory. The 
chapters two, three and four present relevant economic theory for our later discussion. In 
chapter five I address large differences in inflation and output gap between EMU-members in 
the last decade – with the difficulties this meant for conducting a single monetary policy 
optimal for all EMU countries. In chapter six I take a closer look at the deviant in the EMU, 
Ireland, and how their adverse economic behavior resulted in ill-suited monetary policy that 
amplified problematic economic developments and a house bubble. Chapter seven assess the 
consequences of the EMU-membership by comparing to approximately similar countries 
exposed to different monetary regimes. Generally this thesis discusses the functioning of the 
EMU by addressing lessons from monetary policy in the last crisis years. 
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1 Introduction 
The last 15 years have been a time with several economic crises and events. We have seen the 
Asian crisis in 1997-1998, the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999, the 
global financial crisis in the autumn of 2008 and the euro debt-crisis from 2010. 
This thesis will discuss the functioning of the EMU-project in relation to the crisis years from 
2008 and up to the present date. This will be assessed in light of existing optimal currency 
area theory (OCA) and monetary policy theory. Whether EMU can be considered an optimal 
monetary union is large discussion. I will try to shed some light upon this discussion using 
some specific approaches. 
The European monetary union was effective from 1999, with euro banknotes and coins not 
introduced before 2002. First, eleven countries joined (Belgium, Germany, Ireland, Spain, 
France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland), and as of 2013 
the EMU consists of seventeen countries (Greece 2001, Slovenia 2007, Cyprus and Malta 
2008, Slovakia 2009 and Estonia 2011).  
In the first years few argued the EMU’s success. Growth was high in almost all member 
countries, and some countries in the periphery stood out with even higher growth than the 
core. Unfortunately the economic prosperity did not last forever. 
Today the situation in the EMU is quite different from what it was the first years after the 
creation. At present the EMU is experiencing high unemployment and slow growth. In March 
2013 the overall unemployment rate was measured to be 12.1 % (Eurostat), and youth 
unemployment even reaching the double of this number in many countries.  
To which degree is some countries problems today related to their membership in the EMU? 
There exists a lot of theory on what needs to be present for a monetary union to work optimal. 
In this thesis I will present some of this theory, including some monetary theory, and then 
discuss the EMU-project with these aspects in mind.  I will mostly use the Taylor rule as a 
point of departure for how the national economies would have liked to see monetary policy 
being conducted.  
Did the divergences between the members become too big? How ill-suited did the single ECB 
interest-rate become for some members? Would some countries have had advantages from 
11 
 
being able to conduct a different policy both before and after the crisis in 2008? Have any 
countries been able to utilize their position outside the EMU? This is the kind of questions I 
try to address in this paper. For this purpose I draw on research papers, statistical databases 
(OECD and Eurostat) and my own analyzes. Alongside a general assessment of the 
differences within the EMU I approach these questions in two distinct ways. First, taking a 
closer look a country (Ireland) that might have had too different economic performance from 
the core of the EMU, and second, comparing a country within the union with a country 
outside (Netherlands and Sweden). 
The chapters 2-4 go through theory central for our later discussion. Chapter 2 consists of 
monetary theory I find relevant and the arguments for the inflation-target framework present 
in most developed economies today. Chapter 3 is an introduction to some of the key-concepts 
in OCA-theory. Chapter 4 looks into the role of the ECB, their tools and objectives, and 
describes the instruments they have at their disposal for conducting monetary policy. The last 
3 chapters seek to explore some of the problematic aspects of the EMU project the last crisis 
years. In chapter 5 I try to address the differences in economic performance between the 
EMU-countries. Here I also look at the differences between what interest rate a Taylor-rule 
would predict for each country and what was set by the ECB, and address differences in 
inflation rates and output-gaps within the EMU. I use the Taylor-rule as a proxy for how a 
hypothetical national central bank would have liked to see monetary policy being conducted. 
Chapter 6 takes a closer look at Ireland as the deviant in the EMU, with economic activity 
diverging excessively from the core, and try to address whether they could have utilized from 
having a national central bank. Chapter 7 is an attempt to assess whether it could have been 
advantageous to stay outside the currency union through the last year’s economic distress. To 
do this I compare Netherlands and Sweden. Netherlands as member of the currency union and 
exposed to the monetary policy the ECB decides upon, and Sweden with a national central 
bank with the possibility to conduct independent monetary policy. In this chapter I try to 
assess whether different economic performance can be related to their different policy 
regimes, namely, whether Sweden’s role outside the EMU is the source of different economic 
performance from the Netherlands. 
At last I summarize my discussion and make concluding remarks. 
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2 Key concepts in monetary policy  
2.1 Monetary policy  
Monetary policy theory is concerned with understanding the relationship between nominal 
and real variables. Such as real GDP, real interest rates and unemployment on the hand, and 
inflation, nominal short term interest rates, nominal exchange rates and money supply on the 
other. Monetary policy in a more practical sense is occupied with understanding the real 
effects of central banks actions. The role of monetary policy is to maximize welfare of the 
public, and which way to pursue this is what theory of monetary policy deal with.  
A central model to discuss the time-inconsistency problem with monetary policy is the Barro-
Gordon model(Gali 2008). This model discusses the time-inconsistency problem that arises if 
central bankers conduct discretionary monetary policy with preferences over inflation and 
output, and the public have rational expectations. With discretionary policy central bankers 
will always have a short-term gain from creating surprise-inflation and boost output, creating 
an inflation-bias. The solution to this problem was proposed in a well known paper from the 
1980s published by Kenneth Rogoff: “Society can sometimes make itself better off by 
appointing a central banker who does not share the social objective function, but instead 
places “too large” a weight on inflation-rate stabilization relative to employment 
stabilization” (Rogoff 1985). This described regime is the most common practice in modern 
economies today and made the theoretic foundation for the principal-agent framework; that 
independent central bankers follow a contract set by the government with the objective of 
achieving an inflation target.  
2.2 Instruments in monetary policy 
A central bank has two instruments in their execution of monetary policy - the interest rate 
and communication, with the interest rate being the primary. The transmission mechanism of 
the central banks official interest rates influence on inflation can be illustrated in several 
ways, and in figure 1 I have included a graphical illustration of how the ECB (most relevant 
central bank) interpret the transmission. The key policy interest rate set by the central bank 
has a direct effect on money market interest rates and inflation expectations, and a lagged 
effect on variables such as unemployment, inflation and GDP. The key-policy rate generally 
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works through the demand-channel, the expectation-channel and the exchange rate-channel - 
all affecting the real economy eventually in an environment where the official rate affects the 
money market rates. In a real-world setting it is important to keep in mind the shortcomings 
and caveats with this picture. There are two specific aspects to keep in mind - informational 
problems, and time lags - both internal and external. First, it is not obvious that the 
information the central bank have about the economy is absolutely correct. Second, it takes 
time from when changes in inflation and the output gap reach the central bank (internal lags) 
and make them capable of responding, and on the other sides it takes time before monetary 
policy responses from a central bank influence the real economy (external lags). 
Figure 1 - The transmission mechanism of interest rates 
 
Source: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/intro/transmission/html/index.en.html 
The interest rate set by the central bank is the most recognized and obvious instrument used 
when conducting monetary policy and achieving the inflation target, but communication is 
also an important one. A few decades ago the convention among central bankers was to 
relieve as little information as possible about their monetary policy. The recent year’s 
development has been to be more open about their objectives, intentions and actions. The 
reasons for a more open communication were, I think, summed up in a speech by Lucas 
Papademos, Vice President of the ECB at the Annual Meeting of the Allied Social Science 
Associations New Orleans, 5 January 2008: 
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“Nowadays, it is widely recognized that increased transparency and enhanced 
communication are essential and beneficial ingredients of an effective monetary policy. There 
are several reasons for this. These are related to the democratic legitimacy of independent 
central banks, the efficient functioning of the economy and the effectiveness with which 
monetary policy can attain its objectives.” 
Enhancing the effectiveness of attaining the central banks objectives, and increasing the 
accountability with respect to their targets can be achieved through communication. 
Announcing the explicit inflation target can also help anchoring the inflation expectations 
among wage- and price-setters. 
There are several examples of communication as an explicit central bank instrument from the 
last years. In the US the American federal reserve in an official statement on December 
12.2012 announced it will keep interest rate near zero until unemployment was down to 6.5%. 
This might be seen as trying to increase the accountability. And Mario Draghi used it, in July 
2012 on an investment conference in London, when the debt crisis was close to its peak and 
he pledged to do whatever was necessary to protect the euro zone from collapse, including 
fighting soaring government borrowing costs. His words were "Within our mandate, the ECB 
is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the euro. And believe me, it will be enough”. Here 
trying explicitly to convince the public that the ECB will achieve its goals.  
2.3 The Taylor rule 
When discussing costs and benefits of a monetary union a central part we will be concerned 
with whether the interest rate set by a central bank is optimal for its members or not. A 
concept used for discussing the optimal interest rate is a Taylor type rule. Sometimes 
conducting and understanding monetary policy can be very complex. This rule serves the 
purpose of creating a mechanical concept for setting the nominal interest. Such a mechanical 
framework is advantageous when we want to simplify the assessment of monetary policy. 
The monetary policy-rule later named the Taylor rule was proposed by John Taylor in a paper 
from 1992. According to this paper this policy rule can serve two purposes. First, it is a good 
description of monetary policy setting on US data in the period 1987-1992, and second, he 
argues why it is a good rule to follow for future conduction of monetary policy (Taylor 1993).  
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His main argument is that the Taylor-type rule is the most successful in achieving price 
stability and output-stability in comparison with other types of monetary policy-rules (in the 
period 1987-1992) in other countries (Taylor, 1992, p. 6).  
The Taylor-rule predicts an interest rate from three explanatory variables; the equilibrium real 
interest rate, the output-gap and deviation from inflation target. The rules describe how a 
central bank should behave when inflation deviates from its target. Also it puts emphasis on 
the utilization of the resources in the economy, and explicitly whether the output-gap is above 
or below zero. 
Two obvious shortcomings with a Taylor-type rule are that it does not take foreign interest 
rate and the exchange rate explicitly into account. A central bank might be influenced by the 
interest rate set by their trading partners because of the objective to avoid exchange rate 
fluctuations. F. ex if we assume the ECB was concerned with not deviating from the US key 
interest rate in the years leading up to the 2008 crash, it is easier to reason why the interest 
rate was set as low as it was. 
This predicted rate of interest can be helpful when evaluating a central banks policy, and I 
find it helpful as a point of departure for our discussion. In some central banks specific loss 
functions is also used as a guideline for conducting monetary policy, such as in the 
Norwegian Central bank, but in this thesis I will mostly use the Taylor rule for analyzes. The 
Taylor-rule is a good benchmark for analysis, but also has some shortcomings which is 
important to have in mind, and do not take into account all the variables most central banks 
base their decisions on. The Taylor-rule might first and foremost be seen as easy-to-
understand benchmark when assessing monetary policy. 
Taylor type interest rate rule
1
  
  
       ̇      (  ̇    ̇)    (  )  
  
  - Desired interest rate 
  – Long term real interest rate 
  ̇  - The central banks inflation target level 
                                                 
1
 De Grauwe, 2009, p.179 
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  ̇    ̇  - Inflation-deviation from target level 
   – Output-gap 
   – The central banks weight on stabilizing inflation (must be set above one for the Taylor-
principle to hold). 
   – The central banks weight on stabilizing the output-gap. 
The desired interest rate is the rate that is optimal according to this policy-rule based on given 
values for inflation, the output-gap and the long term interest rate. 
The inflation target is most often set low, but above zero. In Norway the target level of year-
on-year inflation is set to 2.5 % in the medium run, while in the Eurozone it’s expressed as 
close to 2 %. 
  ,   , is the weight on stabilizing respectively inflation and output. For the Taylor-principle 
to hold this parameter must be above 1 (more on this in Taylor-principle). Often this value is 
set to 1.5(See f.ex De Grauwe 2009). The value ay is often set to approximately 0.5. This is 
because stabilizing inflation is often a more important concern for the central bank than the 
output-gap. Also some would argue that stabilizing inflation near its target is enough for the 
output-gap to be stable, which would imply no need for stabilizing output at all. This property 
has been named the divine coincident by Jordi Gali and Oliver Blanchard, but its realism is 
still up for debate among academics. 
This desired interest rate we get out of our calculation is to a large degree decided by which 
value we set on the long-term natural rate of interest. This level is difficult to set accurately 
and studies have been done alone just to find these levels. (Clark and Kozicki 2005). 
Taylor-principle 
The coefficient     must be above 1 for the Taylor-principle to hold. So the central-bank must 
respond by more than one-to-one with deviations in inflation from target. If, say, inflation 
increases with one percent, the interest rate must increase with more than one percent for the 
real rate of interest to increase and dampen the economy. If the interest rate only would 
respond by say 0.9 % to a 1 % inflation increase the real rate would actually decline with 0.1 
and inflation could increase when it is actually intended to decrease, and this would stimulate 
an economy already above full resource utilization.  
17 
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3 Economics of a monetary union – 
theory of an optimal currency area 
There are some economic aspects which is important to have in mind when we are discussing 
costs and aspects related to being a member of a monetary union. Some of these principles I 
will go trough in this section. The costs of joining a monetary union come mainly through 
countries losing an instrument in their national monetary policy. The national central bank 
loses the possibility of changing the price of its own currency (devaluations or revaluations) 
and the short term interest rate. Thus, an independent national policy is no longer possible. A 
single policy can create problems if the countries within the union have different economic 
performance and neither seems to converge. Optimal currency area (OCA) theory tries to 
assess the aspects that are central to consider when we discuss the optimality of a currency 
area, both ex ante and ex post. Recent development in the discussion of OCA has been to 
discuss whether the formation of a currency union is endogenous on the factors that decide 
the optimality of the currency area. This view argues that potential member-countries will 
most likely fulfill the OCA criteria better ex post, than ex ante. Namely that becoming a 
member of the currency union will alone improve the criteria that make the country an 
optimal member of the currency area. In this section I will mainly discuss the criteria 
important to fulfill once the union is created (ex post). The explicit ex ante criteria for the 
EMU is mentioned in subchapter 5.1. The ex post criteria is most commonly referred to as 
automatic stabilizers. Ex ante criteria are general criteria that secure similarity between 
potential members. 
3.1 Different economic activity and shocks within a 
monetary union 
If several countries within a monetary union are hit by a common shock we call this a 
symmetric shock. An example of a shock that was to a large degree symmetric in its nature 
was the financial crisis in 2008. All countries in the Eurozone experienced a much correlated 
fall in economic activity after this negative demand shock. So inflation and GDP reacted 
initially in much the same way in all countries within the EMU. This kind of shock is easier to 
cope with for a central bank than when shocks are asymmetric. In a situation like this, with a 
symmetric shock, an interest rate decrease to boost growth is what suits all members. When 
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the severity of a shock and, in some cases, the sign of the demand shock is different for 
different countries, we call this an asymmetric shock. Now one type of monetary policy might 
be good for one member-country and bad for another. One country might need to dampen 
growth, while another needs a boost. This calls for different mechanisms to rebalance the 
different countries economies.  
There could also be divergences stemming from different growth rates over time. One country 
might grow much stronger than another country within the same monetary union, resulting in 
different output-gaps and inflation rates. This could then make one country in need of 
contractive monetary policy and another one in need of expansionary policies. Two needs 
which is difficult for one central bank to accommodate.  
The key problem of adverse economic activity in a CU is what this leads to in a longer-term 
perspective. A country with activity different from the core of the area might be exposed to an 
interest rate that will be pro-cyclical on economic activity. It might boost an economy already 
above full resource utilization, or further depress an economy with a negative output-gap. 
With only one monetary policy, adverse economic activity in a CU might make the central 
bank unable to conduct welfare maximizing policy for all respective member countries. 
3.2 Automatic stabilizers in a monetary union   
When a country enters a monetary union the possibility to adjust for national demand-shocks 
by using the interest rate disappears. The decision of the optimal interest rate is now decided 
by analyzing the activity in the whole union. In optimal currency area (OCA) theory, labor 
mobility and wage flexibility – often called automatic stabilizers- can work to even out the 
effects of an asymmetric demand shock or general adverse economic performance.  I will now 
explain how this might work. 
Analyzing asymmetric shocks 
We use the Mundell-Fleming model for discussion. The shocks are illustrated using curves for 
aggregated demand and aggregated supply (AS-AD) in an open economy, explaining the 
price level and output through the relationship of supply and demand.  
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Figure 2 - Effect of adverse demand shocks  
2
 
We allow for two different demand shocks to occur in country A and B. Increased demand for 
goods in country A will lead to inflationary pressure, and demand curve shifting to the right. 
While decreased demand in country B leads to increased unemployment and reduced 
inflationary pressure, shifting demand curve to the left. 
With national monetary policies country A might want to use contractive policies while B 
prefer expansive. 
When these two countries find themselves in a currency union the central bank is unable to 
adjust for such an asymmetric shock and the central bank becomes paralyzed. We therefore 
have to look for other mechanisms to work this out. 
In a currency union, using the Mundell-Fleming model, there are two main mechanism which 
can work to stabilize this asymmetry. Wage flexibility and mobility of labor. 
First, let us look at wage flexibility. If wages in both A and B are flexible, increased 
unemployment in country B would lead to workers reducing their wage claims, and decreased 
unemployment in A will lead their workers to increase their wage claims. This will lead to 
opposite shifts in the supply curves in the two countries because firms wage cost will differ. 
These shifts are shown in figure 3. 
                                                 
2
 DeGrauwe, 2009, p.6 
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Figure 3 - Adverse demand shocks and effects when wages are flexible 
3
 
The reduced wage claims in country B lead their firms to be able to produce more profitably 
and their supply curve shifts downward. The opposite mechanism happens in A. So we are 
back in equilibrium E
2 
in A, and F
2 
in B. This wage-flexibility work to increase country B’s 
competitiveness, thus its demand, and reduce demand in A.  
Mobility of labor. This might work as an additive or substitutable mechanism to rebalance an 
asymmetric shock. If labor is mobile, increased unemployment in B will make workers 
migrate to A, where there is increased demand for labor, and reduce unemployment in B. This 
will work to eliminate wage pressure in A, and wage reduction in B. If, say, Germany has low 
unemployment, while Spain has a high level, a high degree of labor mobility will make 
unemployed Spaniards move to Germany where it is easier to find vacant jobs. This will make 
unemployment rates decrease in Spain and increase in Germany.  
So wage flexibility and mobility of labor is two basic conditions for a currency union being 
able to absorb asymmetric shocks and adjust properly. If these automatic stabilizers work 
accordingly, asymmetries within a monetary union will be rebalanced and the need for 
different monetary policy will not be a problem. To secure mobility of labor and wage 
flexibility then becomes a way of securing convergence within a currency union (CU). This 
mechanism is referred to as ex post criteria in OCA-theory. 
                                                 
3
 DeGrauwe, 2009, p.7 
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3.3 Exchange rate economics - effect of 
devaluations 
With high capital mobility, the capital movements decide the exchange rate in the short run. 
These movements are affected by interest rates, expectations and perception of risk. If we 
assume uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) holds the rate of depreciation is decided by 
interest rate differences. With UIP a country can depreciate their currency by keeping interest 
rates lower home than abroad. 
With only one currency the possibility of gaining competitiveness against other members and 
increase demand through devaluations of its currency becomes impossible. So let us look at a 
scenario in connection to this. 
First we consider what would happen to the exchange rate when two countries are hit by 
asymmetric shocks, and they have not yet entered a monetary union. Now the two countries 
would be free to use national monetary policy to adjust economic activity and the price of its 
own currency. 
We still assume country A is experiencing a positive demand shock and B a negative. Now 
consider effects of a given policy from the national central bank. We assume the country 
allow exchange rates to fluctuate. Here country A’s central bank could step in to decrease 
inflation by increasing interest rates and reduce economic activity. While in B the central 
bank could reduce interest rates to increase inflation and boost economic activity. In a case 
like this, if we assume uncovered interest parity, we would expect country B’s currency to 
depreciate because of investors increased demand for the currency with the highest interest 
rate, causing their goods to become more competitive, while country A’s currency would 
appreciate. This will increase demand in B and decrease demand in A. This might then lead 
the two countries production back to equilibrium. 
The effects on aggregate demand from this monetary intervention is illustrated in figure 4 
were demand in A is reduced and demand in B is increased.  Here we assume the initial 
negative effect on demand from the shocks has already occurred. 
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Figure 4 - Effect of devaluation as a response to adverse demand shocks 
4
 
This is no longer a possibility for countries within monetary union experiencing asymmetries. 
Thus, when a country enters a currency union the opportunity to adjust economic activity by 
devaluations is lost.  
3.4 Different growth rates 
Some countries within a union might grow much faster than others, like Ireland in the years 
2000-2008. This could become a problem if the fast growing countries’ import grows faster 
than its export and their trade account deteriorates. In a currency union the fast growing 
country can not solve this by internal devaluation, and national policies to curb inflation and 
growth might be of limited availability - all this making an argument for the need of 
convergence and similarity between the member countries to avoid divergent economic 
performance.   
Another source that might cause divergence is different productivity growth in the traded 
sector between countries in a CU, this can lead to difference in inflation rates. This effect is 
called the Balassa-Samuelson effect (Balassa 1964). This might have been what happened to 
Ireland after they became a member of the euro. Because of large foreign direct investments 
their yearly productivity growth was higher than in the rest of Europe and caused inflation 
rates to also differ from the core of Europe. With such differences in inflation rates within the 
                                                 
4
 DeGrauwe, 2009, p. 8. 
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CU the real-rates will deviate and have diverse implications for the stimulation of economic 
activity within the union, and hence amplify asymmetric developments.   
3.5 Krugman approach vs. European commission 
approach. 
These two views have different opinions on how trade integration affects symmetry between 
countries, and the possibility of asymmetric shocks occurring. This discussion is at the heart 
of whether the creation of a currency union is endogenous on the ex ante criteria. Do countries 
that form a monetary union become more similar or do they specialize in production of 
different goods and become more different? Some argue that creating a currency union will 
accelerate integration and convergence, while the opposing view argues that creating a 
common currency should be the last crowning of integration. These different arguments have 
been summarized into two different names commonly referred to as the European commission 
view and the Krugman view. Below I have illustrated them graphically. 
Figure 5 - Symmetry and trade integration 
5
 
Will further trade integration lead to more or less chance of asymmetric shocks occurring? In 
accordance with the European commission view trade integration will lead to more symmetry. 
Trade between the European countries is mostly intra-industry trade, and this trade will 
increase with more integration. Germany buys cars from France and vice versa. So in this 
                                                 
5
 De Grauwe, 2009, p. 25 
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environment when consumers reduce their demand for cars this affects the countries in mostly 
the same way, so asymmetric shocks are less likely to happen. 
In accordance with the Krugman view, more trade integration leads to more specialization. 
More integration leads to more regional concentration and agglomeration of industrial 
activity. So moving closer toward one European market, specific industrial activities will tend 
to concentrate geographically. Then production of say computers will be specific for one 
region or country. So shocks to a specific sector will tend to hit countries or regions more 
specifically. Which one of the two views are correct is not clear, but if the Krugman view is 
correct this will make asymmetric shocks a larger concern as Europe moves towards greater 
integration. On the other hand you could argue that trade integration will lead too 
concentration of economic activity, but independent of national borders. Say car industry 
might agglomerate in an area including both country A and country B. This way a shock to 
that industry will hit both countries, but still there would be several other countries that will 
not experience this shock, and this would still make a problematic case when there is only a 
single monetary policy to adjust this asymmetry. 
3.6 The most important benefits from sharing a 
common currency. 
Going through OCA-theory there might be easy to conclude there are mostly problems in 
sight, but this could of course not be the case, or else a union like the Euro would never have 
been created. The benefits of a currency-union (De Grauwe, 2009, ch. 3) are easy to forget in 
our assessment and I have briefly included some of most apparent ones below. 
Reduced transaction costs. Actors in the market will no longer have to pay transaction costs 
when exchanging currency to pay for foreign goods.  This is maybe the most obvious benefit, 
and has practical benefits because people do not have to exchange money within the 
Eurozone, but the direct exchange rate cost also disappears. 
Reduced exchange rate speculation. An activity which can be argued whether adds any fruits 
to society at all, and assuming it doesn’t, reduction of this activity can be looked as a welfare 
gain. 
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Price transparency. With only one currency it might be easier for consumers to compare 
prices on the same goods across countries. So tradable goods might converge in price to a 
larger extent than before, and lead to more competition.  
Reduced exchange rate fluctuations. If firms in a monetary union are risk averse they will to 
less extent have to fear income fluctuating because of volatility in their exchange rates. 
Eliminating this uncertainty can be understood as a welfare gain.  
These benefits add up to an environment that hopefully will lead to more trade among the 
members in the union, and increased trade alone, considering classic economic theory, will 
increase the welfare of the people in the union. 
3.7 The core message in OCA-theory 
Adverse economic performance and differences in a monetary union, with only one monetary 
policy can be solved by: 
1) Ex ante: securing convergence and similarity between the members, thus reducing the 
probability of asymmetric shocks or divergent growth rates materializing. 
2) Ex-post: making sure automatic stabilizers like wage flexibility and labor mobility is 
strong enough to account for uneven economic performance once they have occurred. 
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4 The ECB – objectives and 
instruments 
The ECB overtook all the responsibility of conducting monetary policy in the Eurozone when 
stage three of the EMU-creation was enacted and the union was created in 1999. It was now 
supposed to be the central bank on behalf of all its different members - a complex task. In this 
section I will go through the main characteristics of the ECB. 
To deal with the problem of dynamic inconsistency the European Union has made a principal-
agent contract with the central bank to take care of monetary policy, as done in most 
developed economies. The objectives of the ECB are expressed in the Treaty on the 
functioning of the EU. 
“In accordance with Article 127(1) and Article 282(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European 
Union, the primary objective of the ESCB shall be to maintain price stability. Without 
prejudice to the objective of price stability, it shall support the general economic policies in 
the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid 
down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union». (On the statute of the European system 
of central banks and of the European central bank, official journal of the European union, 
9.5.2008). It here creates a clear hierarchy of its objectives, with price stability being the most 
important one. Further it says “..it shall support the general economic policies in the union”. 
According to the ECB this is understood as full employment and balanced economic growth. 
So even though price stability is the primary objective, contributing to a sound economic 
environment is also of expressed importance. 
 
The ECB governing council has defined price stability as year-on-year increase in 
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) below, but close to 2%. This target is to be 
achieved in the medium term, allowing for short term deviations in the short run.  
4.1 Instruments of the ECB 
The ECB has several instruments they can use to achieve their objectives. In their operational 
framework they use open market operations, standing facilities and minimum reserve 
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requirements. They can also use communication to affect expectations. All these instruments 
are used to influence the real economy. Open market operations are the most important tool 
the ECB have to affect the economic activity (De Grauwe, 2009. p. 215). In the open market 
operations the central bank allots liquidity to a given rate or different sums to different rates. 
These transactions are performed through tenders called main refinancing operations 
(MROs). The interest rate set on these MROs is called the repo rate. Later when I refer to the 
key policy rate set by the ECB I refer to this repo-rate set on the MROs. These operations can 
be done through fixed rate or variable rate tenders. In variable rate tenders the repo rate works 
as the minimum rate the ECB will accept bids by the banks. The ECB also sets rates on the 
deposit facility and the marginal lending facility. The deposit facility can be used for 
overnight deposits by banks. The rate on these deposits is lower than on the MROs. The 
marginal lending facility is used by banks to obtain overnight liquidity, the rate on these loans 
are above the MROs. The aim of setting these different rates is to reduce or increase the 
liquidity in the money market, and affect the real economy through the established 
transmission mechanisms described in chapter one. The reserve requirements can also be 
used to affect the money market. This works in the way that an increase in the reserve 
requirement tends to decrease the money stock. 
Additional to these instruments the ECB can use communication to improve effectiveness of 
their policies and strengthen accountability. After each monthly meeting of the governing 
council, the president meets the press to inform the public on what decisions has been made 
and why. This might be seen as a way of strengthen the central banks transparency and 
openness.  
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5 Assessing the asymmetry within the 
EMU 
On the first of January 1999 stage three of the steps towards European integration was 
enacted. The euro was introduced and all responsibility for conducting monetary policy on 
behalf of the EMU-members was given to the ECB.  
Figure 6 shows the average growth values in the EMU since 2005. The first years up to the 
financial crash growth was high and stable, but the economy went into severe contraction 
from autumn 2008. The growth rate picked up in the start of 2009, but went slowly 
downwards again when the euro-debt crisis materialized in 2010. Today the growth rate in 
Europe is close to zero, and some countries in the periphery still experience growth rates 
equivalent to contraction.  
 
Figure 6 - Growth in GDP quarter on quarter in EMU 2005-2012 
Source: Oecd 
Independent of the causes the last decade has been a bumpy ride for the EMU, and generally 
the developed economies in the western world. First the financial crash in 2008 and then the 
sovereign debt crisis in Europe from 2010 has sees many economies troubling.  The EMU, 
which first started as a happy child, have met difficulties in its puberty. In the first years 
several European economies were flourishing, and the EMU was perceived as a success. Now 
the situation is somewhat different. In March 2013 the overall unemployment rate was 
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measured at record high of 12,1% (Eurostat), and youth unemployment even reaching the 
double in many countries.  
How does the troubles today relate to the countries membership in the EMU?  And how ill 
suited did the single ECB-rate become for some countries? These questions I will address in 
the light of theory presented in the first two chapters. 
As in most economic fields, there have been shed light on these questions before. A paper on 
related issues is from 2009 when John Taylor published a paper called ‘The Financial Crisis 
and The Policy Response: An empirical analysis of what went wrong’. In this text he 
addresses the Federal reserves monetary policy in the years before the financial crisis in light 
of the Taylor rule. Here he focuses on the US, but also touch upon related European 
problems. In Taylor’s original paper he argues that the loose monetary policy from US central 
bankers was central in accelerating the American housing boom. He runs a regression relating 
housing starts to the interest rate, and then goes on to simulate housing starts had the Taylor-
rule been followed, resulting in much lower housing start predictions. For Europe the paper 
address a high correlation between housing investments and deviation from a Taylor-rule. 
With Spain, Ireland and Greece standing out with the largest deviations from the rule, thus the 
highest investments in housing(Taylor 2009). 
 
When evaluating monetary policy it is helpful to have an explicit point of departure. In this 
section I will discuss the ECB rate in light of the predictions using a Taylor rule.  
To give a background for discussing the ECB-rate I have included the key policy rate-setting 
of the ECB since 1999 in figure 7 below. 
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Figure 7 – ECB’s MRO rates 1999-2012 
Source: Tradingeconomics.com 
It gives a general picture of the economic conditions in Europe, and the ECBs response to it 
the last decade. You can see two peaks, one in start of the new millennium, and the other one 
in connection to the financial crash in 2008.  
5.1 The asymmetries in the European Monetary 
Union 
Since the start of the EMU-project the divergences between the members have been present. 
When asymmetries once have materialized ex-post criteria can help rebalance the differences. 
To secure convergence and reduce the chance of asymmetries actually developing countries 
should show similar results on economic indicators like inflation, public debt, exchange rate 
fluctuations and current accounts. These are called general convergence criteria to secure that 
the economies entering the CU is not too different in an economic sense ex ante. The 
convergence criterions in the Treaty establishing the European Community (EC Treaty) were 
meant to secure this similarity between the members adopting the currency. They were made 
upon four formative criterions members had to accommodate. Price stability, government 
finances, exchange rates and long-term interest rates had to be according to specific targets 
(Article 121(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (EC Treaty)).  
Fulfilling these criteria were an important step to secure convergence and similarity between 
the members. Despite of these measures to reduce the risk of divergence the last decade have 
shown that EMU’s members differed a lot in economic activity. In figure 8 I have included a 
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chart showing the most positive and the most negative measured output-gap in the period 
1999-2012. This chart gives an overview of the differences present since the start of the single 
currency. In figure 9 I have calculated the deviations between the most positive and most 
negative output gap among EMU member countries measured each year. Showing increased 
differences in the years 2010-2012. With a difference of 13,97 % in output gap in 2012 – 
making it difficult to conduct a suitable monetary policy for all member countries.  
Figure 8 - Maximum and minimum output-gap measured in EMU 1999-2012 
Source: Eurostat and own calculations. 
Figure 9 - % difference between the maximum and minimum output-gap in the EMU -
1999-2012 
6
Source: OECD and own calculations. 
When the European monetary union was created most people realized that asymmetric shocks 
could occur, but policy makers took a chance that the union would be capable of handling 
these asymmetries, and that automatic stabilizers like wage flexibility, labor mobility and 
additional adjustments by the ECB would be enough to account for these. Today we got 
                                                 
6
 OECD calculations on output gaps follows a production function approach, this method takes into account  the 
capital stock, changes in labor supply, factor productivities and underlying "non-accelerating inflation rates of 
unemployment" (NAIRU) (http://www.oecd.org/eco/outlook/forecastingmethodsandanalyticaltools.htm). 
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results from over ten years with the euro. Although it’s not trivial to declare causation behind 
asymmetries and the problems in the Eurozone today, it’s safe to say they have been part of 
the problem. 
Having a single monetary policy is problematic when you have got inflation rates differing in 
the whole union. Figure 10 is a chart showing the differences in inflation rates within the 
Eurozone – making it clear the difficulties of conducting a monetary policy suitable for all 
members, and the fact that one single nominal rate set by the ECB gave severely different real 
rates. In 2010 when some countries in the EMU had severe debt-problems the difference 
between the max and min inflation was 6,3 %. In 2011 and 2012 the difference in inflation 
has been reduced while the difference in output gap has increased. 
Figure 10 - Maximum and minimum measured inflation in the EMU - 1999-2012 
Source: Eurostat and own calculations. 
Figure 11 - % difference between minimum and maximum measured inflation rates in 
the EMU - 1999-2012 
Source: Eurostat and own calculations 
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5.2 Assessing EMUs divergences using a Taylor 
rule 
To give an insight into what countries that has been exposed to particularly ill-suited interest 
rates I have looked into each original member of the EMU plus Greece’ situation. 
Figure 12 is a chart showing average of absolute deviations from a Taylor-rule since the EMU 
was introduced and up to 2012. It is calculated as the predicted rate minus the ECB-rate. So 
values high above zero mean the country were exposed to rates far from what a national 
central bank following a Taylor rule would have desired. I have used annual values of 
inflation and output-gap, and then got a total of absolute deviations which I have averaged out 
dividing on number of years. So what you so below is the average of absolute deviations. I 
have used the Taylor rule presented in chapter one.   
Figure 12 - Average of absolute deviation from Taylor-rule - 1999-2012 
7
Source: Eurostat and own calculations
8
.  
This figure show average of absolute deviations for every original member in the EMU plus 
Greece, and all countries were exposed to interest rates way lower than what a rule like this 
suggested. These deviations are not because of fluctuations around a Taylor rule, but rather 
because of persistently exposure to mostly interest rate lower than what a Taylor rule would 
suggest.  
Interesting to take from this chart is that when we use inflation and output-gap values for the 
euro average we see that the average of absolute deviation from a Taylor rule is 1,98 %. This 
is because the ECB conducted a monetary policy with rates lower than the Taylor-rule would 
                                                 
7
 I have used the ECB-rate at the end of each year, and annual output gap values. All these data are included in 
the attachments. 
8
 The table results are calculated with output gap and inflation-values from Eurostat. Parameter values used:  
natural rate of interest = 2 % and inflation target = 2 %.  
Euroavg Belguim Germany Ireland Greece Spain France Italy
Louxemb
ourg
Netherla
nds
Austria Portugal Finland
Series1 1,98 2,21 1,45 6,27 3,77 2,95 1,85 2,37 3,32 2,07 1,96 2,89 2,01
0,00
2,00
4,00
6,00
8,00
35 
 
predict even when we use euro-average values of inflation and the output-gap (as will be 
shown in figure 13).  
Some of the deviation you see in figure 12 is because of the Taylor rule predicting negative 
rates. Until 2009 a Taylor rule predicts only positive interest rates for all EMU-members. In 
2009 a Taylor rule predicted negative rates for several countries, and Ireland and Greece also 
had prediction of negative rates later. 
Table 1 Predicted negative Taylor rates in the crisis years 
Germany -0,12(2009) 
Ireland -0,53 (2009), -4,34(2010), -0,52(2012) 
Greece -4,5(2012) 
Spain -1,24(2009) 
France -0,21(2009) 
Portugal -1,90(2009) 
 
For Ireland the total deviation in figure 12 show an average deviation of 6,27 , approximately 
0,96 of this is due to the Taylor rule predicting negative values. The deviation caused by a 
prediction of negative rates would have been present even for a national central bank able to 
conduct its own policy. 
Whether the deviations are because of fluctuations around a Taylor-rule or not could be 
addressed by comparing the average of absolute deviations to simple average deviations. If 
the average of absolute deviation from a Taylor-rule is because of steady fluctuations above 
and below, the simple average would be close to zero. The results you can see in the table 
below. Numbers for Netherlands show 2,07 % average deviation for both absolute and simple 
average. This means they have been exposed consistently to an ECB-rate lower than what a 
Taylor-rule would predict for the whole period 1999-2012. A country like Ireland has a much 
lower simple average than absolute because before 2008 they needed higher key rates, and 
after 2008 lower key rates than what was set by the ECB. 
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Table 2 – Average deviation and average of absolute deviation 
 Euro Bel Ger Ire Gre Sp Fr Ital Loux Neth Aus Port Fin 
Average of 
absolute 
deviation 
1,98 2,21 1,45 6,27 3,77 2,95 1,85 2,37 3,32 2,07 1,96 2,89 2,01 
Simple 
average 
deviation 
1,79 2,06 0,85 3,96 3,02 2,58 1,6 2,23 3,16 2,07 1,78 2,47 1,91 
 
So how much of the deviation is because of a country having different economic performance 
from the EMU-core and how much is just due to ECBs deviation from the rule?  Figure 13 is 
a chart showing that compared to the Taylor-rule; the ECB-rate has been lower in almost all 
years since 1999, except after the financial crash when desired interest rates were below the 
zero-lower-bound. Here I have used average values for inflation and output gap in the whole 
EMU-area. This chart could make one capable of arguing for the ECB conducting too loose 
policies the last decade, at least if we assume a Taylor-rule predicted rate is optimal. 
Figure 13 - ECB key policy rate compared to Taylor rule - 1999-2012 
Source: Eurostat and own calculations. 
If we take the ECBs average of absolute deviation from the Taylor rule of 1,98 % into account 
we can say something of which countries that have had economic activity higher or lower 
than what the ECB has defined as the average EMU-values. This is done by subtracting ECBs 
own average of absolute deviation from all the specific countries’ average - resulting in much 
lower deviation for all countries. We would expect the deviation to be close to zero if the 
-4,0
-2,0
0,0
2,0
4,0
6,0
8,0
10,0
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Taylor rule
ECB-rate
37 
 
country had average economic conditions close to the core of Europe, hence great deviations 
is an approximation to a countries’ degree of asymmetry, and a measure of how ill-suited the 
nominal interest rate became for  some countries.  
Figure 14 - Deviation from Taylor-rule subtracting ECBs own deviation from the rule - 
1999-2012 
Source: Eurostat and own calculations. 
Countries like Germany, France and Austria have actually had average deviations from a 
Taylor rule lower than what is the case for euro-average values, implying that they have been 
some of the countries which have been exposed to the most suited monetary policy in the 
period 1999-2012. Also countries like Belgium, Netherlands, Austria and Finland look like 
they have had economic activity close to the Euro-average. While countries like Ireland, 
Greece, Spain, Portugal, Italy (often referred to as the GIIPS-countries) and Luxembourg, 
experienced rates far from what a Taylor rule would suggest and especially before 2008 a too 
loose monetary policy, mostly because of their adverse economic performance from the core. 
This implies how the monetary policy of the ECB became particularly ill-suited for some 
countries in the periphery. This reasoning can be backed up if we look at a chart (figure 15) 
showing the difference between Taylor-rule predictions for the PIGS-countries (without Italy) 
compared to Germany. Here I have calculated the average prediction for the four countries in 
the periphery and compared them to predictions for Germany.  
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Figure 15 - Difference in predicted rate using a Taylor-rule for Germany and the GIPS-
countries - 1999-2012 
Source: Eurostat and own calculations 
You might expect the trouble coming directly to those having largest difference from the core, 
but important to keep in mind here is that the level of flexibility and automatic stabilizers also 
plays a role. A higher labor mobility and wage flexibility could make a country more capable 
of handling a less suited monetary policy. 
To give an overview of the relationship between deviation from a Taylor rule and the 
economic performance today I have, in figure 16, plotted average deviation from a Taylor-
rule pre-crisis years (1999-2007) together with the output gap today. The PIIGS countries are 
situated close to each other. Though, it is important to keep in mind that correlation does not 
imply causation, but this chart nevertheless show a relation between deviation from a Taylor-
rule and the negative output-gap today. Of course, directly you could argue that the negative 
output-gaps you see today is a result of the austerity measures in these countries, but then on 
the other hand, these austerity measures you could argue is a result of excessive borrowing 
due to low borrowing costs in the years before the financial crash, namely the non-suited low 
key rates set by the ECB. 
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Figure 16 - Trend between deviation from Taylor-rule 1999-2007 and output-gap in 
2012 
Source: Eurostat and own calculations 
This chart serves the purpose of motivating my next chapter about Ireland. In this chapter I 
will seek to explore more specifically their relationship between ill-suited low interest rates in 
the years leading up to the crisis and the bad economic performance in 2008-2012.  
Some remarks are though worth mentioning about this figure. All PIIGS-countries in the oval 
are to the right of all the others except Luxembourg, which is just a city state and hardly 
comparable. The slope of the trend line is determined by the positions of Ireland and Greece 
relative to the large group in the upper left corner. Hence, the difference between Ireland and 
Greece means that the variance on the slope estimator must be large with a low R-squared of 
0,4171.  
Greece has a huge negative output gap today, but deviates excessively from the trend line 
because it has not had a deviation from the Taylor-rule as high as the negative output gap 
today would imply. Here the austerity measures might have amplified their recession. Also 
Ireland stands out because they have had a deviation from the Taylor-rule that would imply an 
even more negative output gap today, but have managed a recovery better than most PIIGS-
countries.  
A caveat to keep in mind in the discussion in this chapter is the possibility that the deviation 
from the Taylor rule is a result of the natural real interest rate actually being lower than 2 %. 
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The discussion of the right value for this parameter is outside the scope of my thesis, but 
should be problematized to avoid too easy and quick conclusions. See the publication ‘The 
natural rate of interest and the output gap in the euro: a joint estimation ’(Garnier and 
Wilhelmsen 2009). 
As can be understood from this chapter many of the EMU-countries had economic 
performance and indicators that differed severely from the rest. To further investigate the 
relationship between ill-suited monetary policy and the problems today I will look more 
closely into one particular country, Ireland. 
41 
 
6 A closer look at Ireland  
The Irish economy is story of an economy that flew high, and fell deep, housing investments 
that exploded alongside their prices, and economic activity which deviated heavily from the 
core of the EMU. They are an example of an economy were the divergence from the EMU 
maybe became too big to tackle a monetary policy most suitable for the core of the currency 
zone. 
This section seeks to explore the relationship between Ireland’s economic performance since 
1999 and the ill-suited monetary policy set by the ECB. I do not prove any causal 
mechanisms, but rather generally address how severely different the economic indicators was 
for Ireland compared to the rest of the EMU. 
The adverse economic performance 
Asymmetric shocks happen when specific countries within a monetary union are struck by 
shocks unique for their region. There could also be asymmetric economic activity, if a country 
has a much higher growth rate than others not specifically deriving from shocks. Ireland is 
especially interesting to look at in connection to this because they diverged from the EMU-
core more than any other country. So how has the Irish economy performed since they joined 
the EMU in 1999? 
Figure 17 - Irish and Euro-area output-gap 1999-2014 
 Source: Eurostat 
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
199519961997199819992000200120022003200420052006200720082009201020112012
D
e
vi
at
io
n
 f
ro
m
 p
o
te
n
ti
al
 g
d
p
 in
 
p
e
rc
e
n
t 
Ireland
Euro-area
Forecast 
42 
 
Ireland experienced economic growth way above the euro area average in the years after the 
creation of the monetary union. Economic growth was one of the highest in Europe, real 
disposable income rose dramatically, and housing prices accelerated. The difference in the 
output-gap you see in figure 17 above shows divergences to an extent that made a similar 
monetary policy unlikely to fit both. Ireland was already growing faster than the rest of 
Europe when they joined the EMU (marked with a vertical line), and the divergence just 
increased in the years that followed. When the financial crash struck the world economy 
Ireland was hit harder than many of its neighbors, and like most of the other European 
countries the government borrowed excessively to finance government spending, and public 
debt increased heavily (see figure 18), but as you can see the Irish debt increased in a much 
larger and different sense than both the average in the EMU and Germany. 
Figure 18 - Government deficit/surplus - % of GDP - EMU, Germany and Ireland 
Source: Oecd 
While a country like Germany increased their public debt in much smaller and tolerable 
amount, the Irish debt increased severely reaching a problematic level far away from the 3 % 
of GDP-rule mentioned in the treaty on the convergence criteria. The excessive increase in 
government deficit you see from 2007-2008 was driven by the Irish governments decision to 
help out domestic banks with asset, deposit and bond guarantee schemes. When the housing 
bubble in Ireland burst in mid-2007 their banks suffered major financial losses. The 
government then stepped massively in with different bank guarantee measures. The Irish 
government used a total of 198,1 % (Levy and Schich, 2010, p.40) of GDP in 2008 to provide 
financial support measures to domestic banks - clearly the highest amount among the 
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European states. These guarantee measures together with pro-cyclical fiscal policy lead to a 
massive increase in government deficit. 
First, the debt seemed tolerable for Ireland, but from the autumn of 2010, investors realized 
the possibility of sovereign debt default and Ireland was closed out of sovereign bond 
markets. The government was in need of “bail-out” from the EU, ECB and IMF (Troika) to 
finance their large public debt obligations, and help was provided conditioning on austerity 
measures to calm markets and reduce the chance of a sovereign debt default. 
Ireland is an interesting case because the deviations from the euro core were so dramatic, and 
the problems today are so apparent. It is of course problematic to conclude causation between 
the ill-suited policy and the problems today, but stating it has been partly responsible is not a 
radical hypothesis.  
Although Ireland has a relatively flexible labor market, measured by the World Bank Labor 
market flexibility index (Cuñat and Melitz 2011), compared to rest of Europe, the divergence 
probably became too large to be dealt with by automatic stabilizers. Especially their housing 
sector experienced growth excessively different (figure 23) from to core of the EMU. 
6.1 Ireland’s deviation from a Taylor rule 
You see in the chart below (figure 19) that Ireland was exposed to key policy rates much 
lower than optimal by a Taylor-rule. These low rates resulted in lax lending standards and 
easy access to cheap credit, and excessive borrowing to finance investment in an economy 
already above full resource utilization. In figure 19 I have drawn a chart showing the 
difference between an interest rate predicted by a Taylor-rule and the ECB-rate. Showing the 
de facto ECB-rate much lower than what was optimal by this rule for Ireland. 
. 
44 
 
Figure 19 - Irish optimal rate vs. ECB rate 2000-2011 
Source: Eurostat and own calculations. 
In all years since introduction to the EMU and up to 2008 Ireland was exposed to a rate lower 
than optimal according to a Taylor-rule. This chart shows a country which experienced 
monetary policy becoming particularly ill-suited because of their divergence from the core. 
The key policy rates suggested by a Taylor-rule should have been higher in all the years since 
the introduction of the euro and up to autumn 2008. After the financial crisis in 2008 the 
preferred rate was much lower than the ECB-rate, and called for impossible negative rates. 
You could of course problematize the optimality of an interest rate found by a Taylor-rule, 
and some national central banks would not have followed such a rule exactly anyway(at least 
with negative rates), but it is hard to think of a national monetary policy that would have 
deviated like in this case. In this manner you could argue that Ireland suffered from being 
unable to conduct their own monetary policy, independent of the reason for their divergence. 
Ireland had higher inflation than most countries and so the real rate was severely lower than 
the nominal rate. The difference in real rates you can see in figure 20 below where I have 
included the German and average EMU-real rates. Ireland had negative real rates almost the 
whole period from the start of the EMU until 2008, and this happened at the same time as 
economic activity already was way above full resource utilization.  
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Figure 20 - Irish, German and EMU real-rates - 1999-2012 
Source: Eurostat and own calculations. 
Another chart which emphasizes the asymmetry between Ireland and the EMU can be made 
looking at the unemployment rates. While the average unemployment rate in Europe has not 
changed that much during the last year’s economic distress, the Irish rates were well below 
euro average until 2008 with a low of close to 4 % right before the crisis, and accelerated to 
reach a level close to 14 % in the start of 2011. 
Figure 21 - EMU and Irish unemployment rates - 2000-2012 
Source: Eurostat 
6.2 Irelands current account deterioration  
In chapter 2 on OCA-theory I mentioned how different growth rates could become a problem 
if it deteriorated the fast growing countries trade account. This is close to what happened in 
the case of Ireland vs. Germany. Ireland experienced trade account deficit when the country 
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grew faster than the core of the EMU, while a country like Germany had an excessive trade 
account surplus. Ireland’s high growth led to increased demand for foreign goods (imports) 
while export demand did not change accordingly. This trend was difficult to turn, and did not 
before the growth pace seriously slowed down. When the Irish CA reached a surplus in 2010 
the economy had then been contracting since autumn 2008. 
Figure 22 - German and Irish current account - 1999-2011 
Source: Eurostat 
6.3 Housing bubble  
Alongside prosperous economic growth the Irish housing market prices rose dramatically 
from the millennium-shift and up to the financial crash in 2008. Prices reached its peak in 
2007 and bottom low by July 2011, resulting in a total decline of 43 % (Eurostat) - nothing 
less than a housing bubble that burst (see figure 23). I have included the development of the 
German prices to give a perception of the divergence within the EMU.  
  
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
%
 o
f 
G
D
P
 
Germany
Ireland
 
47 
 
Figure 23 - Real house prices - % change from previous year - Germany, Netherlands 
and Ireland – 2005-2011 
Source: OECD 
This chart gives an insight into the large differences between three countries within the 
currency zone. Germany with one the lowest growth rates pre 2008 and the highest growth 
after 2008. Netherlands I have included because they represent a more average path for the 
countries in the EMU, and Ireland with a bubble that burst from around mid 2007. 
Housing and construction bubbles are highly correlated in nature, and create self-reinforcing 
mechanisms, often difficult to distinguish what causes what. When housing prices increase, it 
is more profitable to go into construction, and the constructers also needs housing, which 
might even increase demand further. On the side of those looking for a house, it’s profitable 
to invest in housing as long as the prices grow, and the banks are not as reluctant to give 
mortgages with security in the property as long as the value of the houses keeps growing. 
According to economic theory house prices increase when demand increase and the supply do 
no react accordingly to offset the new demand. The complexity with housing is that the 
supply response will always take time because building a house is a time-consuming activity, 
making property prices almost always increasing when demand increases. Irish housing 
construction increased heavily as a response to the increased demand, and the supply response 
was clearly evident, but obviously not enough to stop the bubble from expanding and prices to 
accelerate dramatically. 
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What role did low interest rates play in creating the Irish housing 
bubble?  
I have not identified any causal channel between low interest rates and the Irish housing 
bubble, but at least with economic theory you could argue for causation between low real 
rates and increased growth in housing prices. How do low key rates increase demand for 
housing? The transmission channel could be described trivially; low interest rates make credit 
and borrowing cheap, access to mortgage easier, and so demand for housing investment 
increases, so the low rates could increase housing prices. Also in Taylor’s paper (2009) he 
argues for similar causal relationship, although for the US housing market, in a subchapter 
called ‘No Boom, No Bust’, namely the relationship between the low key-rates set by the 
central bank and the bubble that developed in the housing market. He argues that the housing 
bubble could have been avoided had the Taylor-rule been followed 
The idiosyncratic nature of the Irish housing price development and the fact that housing 
prices is not an explicit concern for the central bank made interventions to account for this 
specific bubble problematic to deal with for a monetary policy that was supposed to be 
optimal for the whole currency zone.  
Can we point to other explanations to describe Ireland’s divergent growth pace? One 
hypothesis is Ireland’s attractiveness as destination for foreign direct investments (FDI). 
Many non-European firms used Ireland as an entrance to the European internal market after 
the creation of the EMU. Ireland as the only English speaking country in the EMU, together 
with low corporate tax-rates made Ireland particularly popular for foreign investment. This 
made investments in Ireland more attractive than other EMU-countries. Unregulated lending 
standards, and absence of supervision of the financial institutions, could also be argued to 
have had an amplifying effect on the property bubble and overinvestment, but not to have 
been the driving forces. 
6.4 Could we blame the loose monetary policy? 
Independent of whether too low and ill-suited interest rates were the driving force or not, you 
could argue that the strong growth should have been slowed down by contractive monetary 
policy. Something that could have decreased the economic recession and contributed to a 
soft(er) landing, but was difficult because of Ireland’s divergence from the core of the EMU. 
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It is natural that ‘one size do not fit all’ in a monetary union, but Ireland can be argued to have 
been in a situation where the monetary policy became particularly ill-suited. Also when the 
automatic stabilizers to account for these asymmetries did not work satisfyingly to make 
Ireland converge back to euro-average economic standards their divergence from the core 
made them particularly vulnerable to loose monetary policy. Independent of the cause of 
Irelands problems their divergence from the core of the EMU was much higher than 
established OCA-theory find optimal, and maybe too high for Irelands own good. The 
divergence from the core was apparent looking at several different economic indicators, 
something that made the membership to a monetary union problematic. The Irish example 
might also be used as a counter-argument to those that argue a currency union is endogenous 
on the ex-ante criteria in OCA-theory. 
The financial crisis can be seen as an example of a big common shock to the EMU - a shock 
that made it difficult to identify local shocks in that period. The vulnerability was different, 
and Ireland seemed to be one of the countries that were hardest hit when the shock occurred, 
perhaps because monetary policy did not fit local circumstances in earlier periods. Ill-suited 
monetary policy plus the Irish government’s decision to help out troubled banks might be 
seen as a two contributing factors for the Irish problems that materialized in the wake of the 
financial crisis. 
The Irish economic performance deviated heavily from the core of Europe in the years 
leading up to the financial crisis and called for policy different from the rest of the union. In 
the Irish case I would argue that staying outside a currency union could have avoided some of 
Ireland’s problems, at least the degree. A national Irish central bank could of course have 
deviated from a Taylor rule themselves, but it is hard to think of a scenario where the average 
of absolute deviations would have been as large as -  6,27 % in 1999-2012, and even larger 
before the crisis in 2008 with 7,3 % in 1999-2007. 
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7 Netherlands vs. Sweden  
 A pressing question when we study the EMU is how those that have stood outside 
(voluntarily or involuntarily) of the currency union have performed. So in this section I will 
try to discuss the nature of a monetary union using an inside/outside-the monetary union-
approach. Some of the countries which are members of the EU, but not the EMU were not 
able to be part of the currency union because they did not fulfill the convergence criteria, but 
some have decided not to be a part - like Sweden. In this section I will try to shed some light 
upon the question whether it has been advantageous to stay outside the EMU or not during the 
last year’s economic problems 
To discuss advantages/disadvantages of staying within a currency union I will focus on how 
two countries – one inside the EMU and one outside – have developed the last years. 
I will study two countries with similarly economic structure- Netherlands and Sweden, but 
with different monetary policy regimes. Do they make a good comparison? Numbers from 
2011 show they rank close in GDP per head, Sweden with 35 151 $ and Netherlands with 37 
119 $ (Eurostat). They are both small countries compared to the whole union, consisting of 
approximately 5 % (Netherlands) and 2, 85 % (Sweden) (Eurostat) of the population in the 
EMU.  Sweden might have more natural resources than the Dutch’, but both countries have a 
large export oriented sector making them vulnerable to shocks in foreign demand. They can 
both be characterized as small open economies. They are obviously not a perfect match for 
comparison, and assuming both economies would have developed similarly with the same 
monetary regime is of course not the case. Though, for the discussion purposes I find the 
comparison-approach helpful as a point of departure. Sweden has a national central bank, 
while Netherlands is exposed to the monetary policy conducted by the ECB, which is based 
on the whole Eurozone’s economic condition. I will look at their economic development the 
last years and try to discuss if the differences, though small, in output gap stems from Sweden 
being outside the EMU or whether it has to do with fiscal policy. 
First, let us recap what OCA-theory says. The obvious advantage Sweden has is that they can 
conduct their own monetary policy when a shock occurs, while Netherlands has to be exposed 
to a monetary policy suitable for the whole union. You could argue that the Swedish central 
bank will not set rates independent from the ECB because they will try to keep the exchange 
rate stable, but at least the Swedish opportunity for different key interest rates is present, 
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though formally the Riksbank has an inflation target. Implicitly this mean they can boost 
growth more than ECB by lowering rates further down, which also might lead to a 
depreciation of their currency. At least if we assume uncovered interest rate parity with 
perfect capital mobility, interest rate differences between ECB and the Swedish Riksbank 
should lead to changes in the exchange rate. Though, as we will see later different 
mechanisms than UIP drive exchange rate differences in economic distress, especially 
between a small and a large currency. This may imply the opportunity of controlled 
devaluations is not as present as classical OCA-theory would suggest for a country outside a 
currency union with a small currency. 
Let us first look at our two countries economic performance. We study their output gaps from 
1999-2012. In this period both countries were exposed to the financial crash in 2008 and later 
the materialization of the euro-debt crisis from 2010. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and 
general financial collapse in autumn 2008 was felt clearly by all economies in the west, and 
Netherlands and Sweden were no exceptions. So how did the two countries respond? 
Figure 24 - Output-gap Netherlands and Sweden- 1999-2012 
Source: Eurostat 
The chart above shows how both Swedish and the Dutch output-gap dropped from the autumn 
of 2008, and Sweden experienced an even more severe recession than both Netherlands and 
the EMU-average. From around 2010, when the problems caused by the financial crash 
decreased and their economies gained momentum Sweden had a stronger recovery than the 
Netherlands. Today Sweden has a less negative output gap than the Netherlands. 
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Why was the contraction stronger in Sweden? And why did they manage to come back and 
perform better than Netherlands from around January 2010? Can their different economic 
performance be related to their different monetary policy regimes? These are the questions I 
will try to assess in this section.  
7.1 Why was the contraction in Sweden stronger 
than in the Netherlands?  
Sweden went into a larger contraction than both Netherlands and the EMU-average after the 
negative demand shock in 2008. One explanation to Sweden’s large contraction and later 
recovery could be that before the shock in 2008, they had a higher output gap than Europe and 
therefore a harder landing. If we study business cycles this phenomenon is observed many 
times through history, that a stronger boom-like economic expansion makes the following 
contraction stronger.  This phenomenon could be explained in several ways, but one 
hypothesis is the financial accelerator (Bernanke, Gertler et al. 1999)
9
 which explain how 
macroeconomic fluctuations are amplified and propagated by developments in the credit 
markets. If we follow such reasoning (stronger expansion, harder landing), we might also 
explain Sweden’s strong recovery with the size of their contraction, though this is more 
intuitive because an economy with a large negative output-gap has more unfulfilled potential 
to regain. If the no-boom-no-bust story is true, the difference in Sweden’s and the Dutch’ 
economic fluctuations do not stem from different monetary policy regimes, but rather a 
general economic phenomenon. The story of Ireland might give another argument for the 
truthfulness of the no-boom-no-bust hypothesis. They had the highest output-gap in Europe, 
and also the largest contraction. 
7.2 Did the two central banks react differently? 
The opportunity for independent monetary policy is Sweden’s main advantage outside the 
EMU. Did they use the advantage to conduct a more expansive policy? 
                                                 
9
   Firm’s ability to borrow for investments is mainly decided through the market value of their net worth, which 
decides their collateral. With high economic growth, prices and asset values increase, increasing firm’s possible 
collateral and ability to borrow for investments. Increased investments might lead to further increase in net 
worth, which lead to more collateral and even higher ability to borrow. This mechanism is called the financial 
accelerator because it might amplify macroeconomic business cycles. 
53 
 
Both central banks have inflation close to two percent as their main target, but stabilizing 
production and employment is also included in their objectives. 
The two central banks policy is difficult to compare directly, since the ECB conducted policy 
by actively changing the rates on the MRO’s, marginal lending facility and the deposit 
facility, while the Riksbank mainly used the repo-rate to adjust activity. We can not just look 
at their repo rates and conclude the one with the lowest repo rate has the most expansive 
monetary policy. In figure 25 I have included a chart showing the Swedish central bank rate at 
the top and the ECB MRO-rate below, and their response to the reduced demand and troubled 
banks since autumn 2008. At first both banks reacted similarly and by May 2009 the ECB had 
reduced their repo-rates to 1%, while the Riksbank rate stood at 0,5 %. The ECB never went 
lower than this and held the MRO at 1% until April 2011 when they increased rates to 1,25 %, 
but the trouble in 2008 called for more than just interest rate reductions in both regimes. Both 
the Riksbank and the ECB increased supply of liquidity to troubled financial institutions in 
the same period, which might have made the deposit rates more important. They provided 
cheap liquidity and set deposit rates low so that financial institutions would hopefully lend to 
each other and not deposit the money back were they came from. ECB’s deposit rates was 
reduced to 0,25 % (the lowest level) in the same period as their repo rate was at 1 %.  The 
Swedish Riksbank on the other hand lowered their key rate to first 0,5 % and later to 0,25 % 
by mid 2009. In the report on the decision to decrease rates to 0,5 % in April 2009 the 
Swedish Riksbank states that a further decrease by the ECB is expected, something that did 
not happen. Even though the ECB did not decrease their rates further the Swedish Riksbank 
decreased their key rate to 0,25 on a meeting in august 2009. Then deviating with 0,75 % 
from the ECB repo-rate. As the Swedish recovery progressed key rates were slowly raised 
between spring 2010 and late autumn 2011 to a level of 2 %. 
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Figure 25 - The Riksbank and ECB key interest rate setting - 2006-2012 
Source: Tradingeconomics.com  
According to classical economic theory you might argue that general interest rate differences 
as in this case have two effects. First, lower rates by one country compared to another might 
boost growth stronger. Second, assuming perfect capital mobility, lower rates might make 
capital flow to the country with the highest rate, hence decreasing demand for the low-rate-
currency which then depreciates.  
How were the different repo rates set compared to a Taylor rule? Below I have included 
charts showing Taylor rule predictions and the deviation from interest rate set by the two 
central banks in the crisis years. Up to 2010 they both seemed to have rates slightly expansive 
if we use the Taylor rule as point of departure. In the whole period we can see from the 
figures 26 and 27 both the Netherlands and Sweden were exposed to rates lower than what a 
Taylor-rule would predict 
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Figure 26 - Swedish deviation from Taylor-rule 
Source: Oecd and own calculations 
Figure 27 - Dutch deviation from Taylor-rule 
Source: Oecd and own calculations 
Figure 28 - Swedish and Dutch deviation compared 
Source: Oecd and own calculations. 
In figure 28 one can see that the deviations are not severely different except from around mid 
2010 when the deviation is higher for Netherlands. Actually it looks like Sweden have 
deviated more from a Taylor-type-rule in the period 2006-2010. From around 2010 the 
deviations are higher for Netherlands. A hypothesis then is that a national Dutch central bank 
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would have had higher repo-rates post 2010 and the monetary expansiveness would have been 
less than as a member of the EMU. So by looking at national indicators for the Dutch post 
2010 you could argue they would have had less opportunity to reduce rates, ceteris paribus, if 
they were outside the EMU. A remark from this reasoning could be that it does not seem to 
have been a tighter than desired monetary policy that could explain the different development 
between Sweden and the Dutch post-2008. 
7.3 Exchange rate movements 
The other advantage Sweden had compared to Netherlands through the recession in 2008 was 
that they could depreciate their currency compared to the euro, and in this way give their 
export sector a boost. Though, as mentioned, formally the Swedish Central bank has an 
inflation target so you could argue the exchange rate is not interesting except for its impact on 
inflation. 
Was reducing the price of the Krona a goal for the Swedish central bank? If we study reports 
from the Riksbank published after their interest rate meetings in the period 2008-2009 I do 
not find any direct comment stating that their interest rate decreases is motivated by 
devaluation of the Swedish Krona, though this could of course be an implicit goal not directly 
mentioned.  
Figure 29 - Swedish kroner/euro - 2002-2013 
Source: Eurostat. 
If we closely study the development of the Swedish krona compared to the euro it seems to 
have developed independently of the deviations (though small) between the interest rate set 
by the ECB and the Riksbank. So it looks as if the price of the Krona was outside the control 
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of the central bank anyway. This might be used to reason that as long as capital mobility is 
high, the exchange rate is, in the short run, decided by capital movements, and these can be 
independent of the interest rate differences. At least in economic environments like the case 
after autumn 2008 what seemed to drive the depreciation of the Swedish krona was 
expectations and the perception of currency-risk that led investors to sell Swedish kroner. 
Even when assuming UIP would hold, it seems like the Riksbank’s scope for an interest rate 
differential (lower than ECB) to devalue their currency was limited. When both central banks 
have already reduced their rates as much as both the ECB and Riksbank did as a response to 
the demand shock in 2008, the possibility for large interest rate differences to depreciate own 
currency is of limited availability. Admittedly the Riksbank had lower repo-rates than the 
ECB in the period from December 2008 until April 2011, but this deviation was only 0,75% 
at the most. 
The weakening of the Swedish krona can be explained by two factors as I see it. First, 
because of it being a small currency. In economic distress small currencies like the Krona 
depreciate compared to larger currencies like the euro and the dollar. This is because investors 
want to put their money in larger (safer) and more liquid currencies. So the strong 
depreciation can not be explained by uncovered interest rate parity and different interest rates. 
The other explanation is the different inflation rates. In the period of the Krona depreciation 
Sweden had higher inflation rates than the EMU (figure 30).  
Figure 30 - Inflation Netherlands vs Sweden – 2004-2012 
Source: OECD 
With floating exchange-rates, different inflation rates may cause a decreased demand for the 
currency with the highest inflation-rate, hence a depreciation of the Swedish krona. These two 
factors might have worked together to reduce the price of the Swedish currency, though the 
0,0
0,5
1,0
1,5
2,0
2,5
3,0
3,5
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Netherlands
Sweden
58 
 
flight from the Krona because of investors hunt for less risk looks to have been the strongest 
factor. It is difficult to quantify the advantage the weak Krona had on demand for Swedish 
goods, but at least we can say it was positive in sign, and it might have given Swedish export 
firms a small advantage compared to Dutch’ and other European firms. 
7.4 The situation in the financial sector 
Let us look at economic policies independent of the EMU-membership. Did Swedish banks 
trouble more than banks in Europe after the economic downturn in 2008? Figure 31 show the 
3-month money market rates in Sweden and the EMU. I assume these rates are a proxy for the 
public’s perception of trust and robustness of the banks in the respective areas. A sudden 
acceleration of money-market rates would mean the public perceived the banks as less robust 
to stress, and liquidity flows and interbank lending could then slow down. 
Figure 31 - Money market 3-months rates in EMU and Sweden - 2007-2012 
Source: Eurostat 
If these rates would have differed excessively it could have meant banks in either area were in 
larger troubles. If say rates in Sweden were much higher, it could mean the availability of 
credit was lower and this would have affected the economic activity. But as you can see these 
rates have been following the same path for several years. Indicating the banks in EMU and 
Sweden did not trouble at a large adverse degree. 
Have the help provided to the domestic banks been different between these countries in the 
crisis years? In the whole Euro area governments stepped massively in to support the financial 
situation in their domestic banks after the financial crisis in 2008. Different government-
guarantee schemes were used, these guarantees can be divided into three different categories 
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(Levy and Schich 2005), capital injections, asset guarantees and purchases to reduce banks’ 
exposure to capital losses. These measures might have been what rescued some banks from 
defaulting. Was these measures provided at different degrees in Sweden and the Netherlands? 
Netherlands provided asset, deposit and bond guarantees to their banks, while the Swedish 
government did provide deposit and bond guarantees but not for assets (Levy and Schich, 
2005, p. 39). As for financial support measures it looks like the Dutch provided larger 
amounts than the Swedish. They supported financial institutions with guarantees for a total of 
33, 9 % of 2008 GDP, while Sweden used a total of 10, 9 % of GDP in 2008 (Levy and 
Schich, 2010, p. 40).  
Looking at these numbers it looks like the government support to financial institutions was 
more profound in Netherlands than in Sweden, both in types of measures and amounts of 
GDP.  
7.5 What about fiscal policy and government 
stimulus? 
Can different degrees of fiscal stimulus explain the adverse recovery? In economic downturns 
a government can use fiscal policy to increase economic activity. A country can introduce 
Keynesian counter-cyclical economics, and second, letting domestic stabilizers like taxes and 
unemployment benefits work to dampen contractions. The fiscal policies in the EMU are not 
centralized, so here a country like The Netherlands can decide on their policy independent of 
the other countries. So what do the numbers on fiscal stimulus say?  
For this purpose I utilize a report from the European Trade union institute from 2009 (Watt 
and Nikolova 2009). 
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Table 2 - Fiscal stimulus in the crisis years - Netherlands and Sweden 
 Netherlands Sweden EU average
10
 
Overall size of fiscal 
package (% of GDP) 
1 2,4 1,70 
2009 0,45 1,25 0,99 
2010
11
 0,51 1,15 0,61 
Source: (Watt and Nikolova, 2009, p.11-12) 
From the table it is clear that Sweden conducted more fiscal stimulus after the financial crisis 
in 2008. This could be because of their stronger fiscal position than the Netherlands (see 
figure 32). Independent of the causes, a stronger countercyclical policy by the Swedish 
government is one hypothesis that could explain why their recovery was stronger than both 
the Dutch’ and the European average. 
In OECDs survey on the Swedish economy from 2011 (OECD 2011) they write on their fiscal 
policy: “ ..a large fiscal surplus at the onset of the crisis allowed Sweden to let automatic 
stabilizers play their role in full and to introduce discretionary stimulus without threatening 
fiscal sustainability”. As you can see from figure 32, Sweden’s fiscal position has been and 
still is strong compared to both the Dutch and EU15-average. This might have done Sweden 
more able to let fiscal stabilizers play a role in the recovery to a larger extent than the 
Netherlands. In such a case this is independent of Sweden’s role outside the EMU, and 
something the Dutch maybe could have been able to use even as a member of the currency 
union if the government financial balances had been better. On the other hand it should be 
added that the Dutch fiscal consolidation did not really start before September 2012 (OECD 
2012) when their consolidation package was agreed on, introducing structural reforms on 
areas such as pensions, the housing market and the labor market, which would be expected to 
have a dampening effect. So you could argue that even though the Dutch had to introduce 
fiscal consolidation to a larger extent than Sweden, the real tightening was introduced too late 
to explain adverse development in the time before the consolidation package was agreed 
upon. 
                                                 
10 Simple average, not weighted by country size. 
11 The numbers for 2010 is what was foreseen in May 2010. 
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Figure 32 - General government financial balances – Netherlands, Sweden and EU15 
12
Source: Oecd 
What can we conclude?  
The collapse in the world economy in autumn 2008 was felt as a negative demand shock to 
both Sweden and the Netherlands. Sweden first went into a more severe recession, but came 
back stronger than the Netherlands, and today they have a less negative output gap. Can we 
explain Sweden’s strong recovery with their role outside the EMU?  
The Swedish monetary policy was maybe slightly more expansive than what the ECB 
conducted. It is difficult to quantify exactly what impact this had on the Swedish recovery, 
but at least the rates were lower then what the Dutch were exposed to and might have given 
them an advantage with stronger economic stimulation. If Sweden had been a part of the 
EMU much probably they would have been exposed to the monetary policy that the ECB 
conducted, with higher key interest rates.  
The weak Krona? Did Sweden use the opportunity to depreciate their currency? Independent 
of whether the depreciation was intended or not, the Swedish krona did depreciate during the 
financial distress following September 2008. Although the mechanism that made the Krona 
depreciate might have been outside the control of the Swedish central bank and not intended, 
it is a fact that it did, and had they been a member of a the EMU they would most possibly 
have never experienced such a depreciation, and hence the advantage of a slightly more 
competitive position this gave them. 
                                                 
12 OECD’s definition of general government financial balances: Government net lending is general government current tax and non-tax 
receipts less general government total outlays. The EU15 comprises the following 15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. 
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Governments support to financial institutions? The amounts used on support to the financial 
institutions were higher in Netherlands (33, 9 % of 2008 GDP) than in Sweden (10, 9 %). 
What this meant for the recovery one should be careful of making explicit conclusions from. 
The problematic case is whether more financial support was because of the banks being in 
larger trouble in Netherlands, or if the willingness to bail-out banks was stronger and that the 
moral-hazard issues this implied was neglected.  
The fiscal policy? Both countries conducted Keynesian text-book economics in the wake of 
the global crisis in 2008. Sweden used a higher overall amount of GDP on fiscal stimulus, and 
this could of course partly explain a stronger recovery. Although one might say that Sweden 
was in stronger need of fiscal stimulus than the Netherlands because their recession was 
stronger, so that more fiscal stimulus was more because of the amount demanded to bring 
output back to trend rather than the political will to use Keynesian policies. Anyway, the 
different amounts used on fiscal stimulus is independent of the membership in the EMU, and 
if we assume Keynesian stimulus is the source of the adverse recovery after 2010 this is 
independent of the Dutch’ membership in the CU.  
When two economic areas are exposed to the same shock both central banks reduce their rates 
heavily to counter the falling demand. Both the ECB and the Riksbank lowered the rates to a 
level where the Swedish role outside the CU and the opportunity to take advantage of interest 
rate differences was limited. From the indicators studied in this chapter it seems that the most 
apparent advantage Sweden had from staying outside the monetary union was the weakening 
of the Swedish krona and what this meant for their competitive position.  
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8 Concluding remarks 
This thesis has attempted to shed some light upon the functioning of the EMU. This 
discussion has been presented in the light of established monetary policy and optimal 
currency area-theory. 
The chapters two, three and four presented the framework for our further discussion, and 
introduced the problems that could emerge if adverse economic developments (as I presented 
in chapter five and six) would appear.  
This paper has showed that the asymmetries between the member countries maybe became 
too severe, and resulted in, for some countries, ill-suited monetary policy that increased 
problematic developments. In chapter five we went through relevant economic indicators and 
assessed the differences that emerged between the EMU-members the last decade. I addressed 
large differences in both inflation and output-gap between the EMU-members – with the 
difficulties this meant for conducting optimal monetary policy for all the respective EMU-
member states. Chapter five addressed the correlation between deviations from optimal 
interest rates pre-crisis 2008 and a negative output-gap today, though I did not identify a 
causal channel. This chapter, in mind my mind, served two purposes; first, addressing the 
need for similarity in economic performance between members of the same currency-area, 
and second show that the EMU-project might failed in securing convergent developments 
between the member states. Another argument one could take from this chapter is that 
creating a monetary union do not necessarily have an endogenous effect on ex ante OCA 
criteria. As in the case of the EMU it might made the countries diverge because of real rates 
becoming severely different. In chapter six I took a closer look at the deviant in the EMU, 
Ireland, and how their adverse economic performance resulted in ill-suited monetary policy 
that maybe amplified their high and problematic economic growth. From this chapter I would 
reason that Ireland would have benefited from a having a national central bank that could 
dampen the excessive economic activity that took place in the years leading up the crisis years 
from 2008. Chapter seven tried to assess the consequences of a EMU-membership by looking 
at whether differences between two approximately similar countries was a result of them 
being a member of a currency area or not. From this chapter I would reason that it was not 
straightforward to utilize the position outside the EMU for Sweden when the 
interconnectedness to the EMU is as strong as is present in today’s economic environment.  
64 
 
Especially in crisis years like after 2008 when central banks’ key rates is lowered near a zero 
lower bound, an interest rate difference to devalue the domestic currency is of limited 
availability. Though, the Swedish currency did this seemed to have been independent of the 
interest rate differences between the ECB and the Riksbank. 
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Attachments 
Annual values for inflation, output-gap and the ECB rate at the end of each year used for calculation of predicted interest rate using Taylor-
rule. Included are values for the eleven original members from 1999, plus Greece.  
Source: Eurostat and own calculations. 
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